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APPLICATION OF THE UAAA, RUAAA, AND 
STATE ATHLETE-AGENT LAWS TO 
CORRUPTION IN MEN’S COLLEGE 
BASKETBALL AND REVISIONS 





Opening statements in the October 2018 federal trial regarding corruption 
in men’s college basketball served as a juicy appetizer for what was to come in 
the rest of the trial.  Now former Adidas executive James Gatto, former Adidas 
consultant Merl Code, and aspiring agent and former runner for NBA agent 
Andy Miller, Christian Dawkins, faced accusations that they paid money from 
Adidas to prospective student-athletes and their families to ensure the 
prospective student-athletes signed with Adidas-sponsored schools, and then 
with Adidas and certain financial planners and agents once they turned 
professional.1  In her opening statement, Casey Donnelly, Gatto’s attorney, 
admitted that Gatto funneled $100,000 to the family of highly recruited prospect 
Brian Bowen; paid $40,000 to the family of current Dallas Maverick Dennis 
Smith, Jr. while he played for North Carolina State University; and paid $20,000 
to Silvio De Sousa, who played for the University of Kansas during the second 
semester of the 2017-18 season.2  Donnelly went on to state, “The NCAA rules 
 
* Joshua is a Clinical Assistant Professor in the Recreation and Sport Management program at the 
University of Arkansas (J.D., University of Iowa College of Law; B.A., University of Northern Iowa).  Prior 
to entering academia, Joshua spent seven years on Baylor University’s athletics compliance staff, during 
which time he oversaw the university’s agent administration program.  Thanks to the Sports Lawyers 
Association Conference attendees for their feedback.  Any views expressed in this Article are the author’s and 
are not necessarily representative of the University of Arkansas or Baylor University.  Any mistakes are, of 
course, the author’s. 
1.  Mark Schlabach, James Gatto, Merl Code and Christian Dawkins Found Guilty in Pay-for-Play Trial, 
ESPN (Oct. 25, 2018), http://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/article/25072946/james-gatto-merl-code-christian 
-dawkins-found-guilty-college-basketball-pay-play-trial (detailing outcome of trial).   
2.  Rob Dauster, Bombshells in Opening Statements of College Basketball Corruption Trial, MSN (Oct. 
2, 2018), https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/ncaabk/bombshells-in-opening-statements-of-college-
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are not the laws of the country . . . They’re the equivalent of the rules in your 
apartment building.  If you break them, you haven’t broken the law.  It is not 
against the law to violate NCAA rules.”3  Judge Lewis A. Kaplan reminded 
jurors that NCAA rules were not on trial.4 Nonetheless, Donnelly’s statement 
summarized the defendants’ primary defense--that their behavior violated 
NCAA bylaws but did not break federal laws.5 After a three-week trial, 
however, the jury found Gatto, Code, and Dawkins guilty on felony charges of 
wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.6 
Until recently, NCAA rules had long prohibited a basketball student-athlete 
from both hiring and accepting benefits from an agent.7  Following federal 
officials’ public disclosure of the investigation and release of complaints against 
the defendants, and two months prior to the initial trial, the NCAA championed 
 
basketball-corruption-trial/ar-BBNQKZj (describing Gatto’s legal defense strategy).  Defense attorneys 
contended in their opening statement that payment Adidas and Louisville worked to get for Bowen was 
necessary to compete with the University of Oregon.  See Ricky O’Donnell, College Basketball Corruption 
Trial: 5 Things We Learned from Opening Arguments, SBNATION (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/ 
college-basketball/2018/10/2/17929420/fbi-college-basketball-corruption-trial-oregon-adidas-nike-arizona-
kansas-de-sousa (detailing early portion of initial trial). 
3.  Mark Schlabach and Jeff Borzello, Former Adidas Executive James Gatto Didn’t Break Law in 
Orchestrating Payments to Recruits, Attorneys Say, ESPN (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.espn.com/mens-
college-basketball/story/_/id/24872282/former-adidas-executive-james-gatto-break-law-orchestrating-
payments-recruits-attorneys-say (detailing trial’s opening statements); see Michael McCann, College 
Basketball Corruption Trial: Prosecutor’s Case, Explained, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 12, 2018, 
https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/10/12/ncaa-corruption-bribery-trial-brian-bowen-christian-
dawkins (noting NCAA amateurism rules are not laws); see also Anne Ryman, NCAA FBI Investigation: 
College Basketball Trial and What You Need to Know, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 19, 2019, 
https://www.azcentral.com/story/sports/2019/04/18/ncaa-fbi-investigation-college-basketball-trial-arizona-
wildcats-sean-miller-adidas-nike-bribery/3468288002/ (noting defense attorney’s characterization of 
prosecution’s allegations as a “novel theory”). 
4.  Dan Greene, College Basketball Trial Was Always About the NCAA’s Archaic Rules, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/10/24/ncaa-rules-recruiting-
bribery-corruption-trial-fbi (explaining that time and time again Kaplan made clear that case’s central question 
was not whether defendants violated NCAA rules but if they undertook criminal actions and hid them from 
universities). 
5.  See Marc Tracy, Three Found Guilty in N.C.A.A. Basketball Recruiting Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/sports/ncaa-basketball-adidas-guilty.html (describing trial 
outcome); see also O’Donnell, supra note 2 (stating that defense showed its playbook during in opening 
arguments); see also Dan Wetzel, Recruiting Allegations Fly as College Hoops Trial Begins, YAHOO SPORTS! 
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://sports.yahoo.com/opening-statements-college-hoops-corruption-trial-drag-oregon-
fray-reveal-strategies-174516177.html (describing allegations coming out of opening of trial). 
6.  Tracy, supra, note 5 (noting that sentencing would occur in March 2019 with a two to four years prison 
sentence possible); see Kaelen Jones, College Basketball Corruption Trial: Three Found Guilty, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/10/24/ncaa-trial-verdict-fbi-
james-gatto-christian-dawkins (explaining outcome of initial trial).   
7.  NCAA, 2018-19 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.3.1 at 71 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL 2018-19]. 
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“significant changes” to men’s college basketball.8  Changes included the ability 
of certain men’s basketball student-athletes to hire an agent to help them make 
informed decisions about going pro.9  Further, these men’s basketball student-
athletes may now accept certain benefits from agents under revised NCAA 
rules.  When an agent recruits one of the select men’s basketball student-athletes 
who may hire an agent, the agent may pay for meals and transportation for the 
student-athlete and his family when those expenses relate to the agent selection 
process.10  Additionally, once the student-athlete signs with an agent, the agent 
may pay for the student-athlete’s meals, transportation, and lodging when the 
expenses relate to meetings with the agent or a professional team.11   
When implementing these rules changes, the NCAA subsequently 
recognized that the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (“UAAA”) and relevant state 
laws based on it regulate the ability of agents to provide certain expenses prior 
to signing a student-athlete to a representation agreement.12  Thus, the NCAA 
determined that the rule change permitting pre-agreement benefits was not 
effective immediately, but would become effective once states revised their 
laws.13   
There is an important asterisk, however, to both the NCAA’s 
acknowledgment that one of its rule changes impacts an area regulated by states 
and Donnelly’s assertion of the legality of the defendants’ admittedly NCAA 
rule-breaking actions.  Both the NCAA and the defendants failed to fully 
recognize and account for the UAAA and its successor, the Revised Uniform 
Athlete Agents Act (“RUAAA”), either of which the vast majority of states have 
 
8.  NCAA, Statement from NCAA Leaders on College Basketball Reforms, NCAA (Aug. 8, 2018), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/statement-ncaa-leaders-college-basketball-reforms 
(describing changes resulting from federal investigation).   
9.  Id. (describing rules changes related to providing flexibility to men’s basketball student-athletes 
considering leaving school early to turn professional). 
10.  See NCAA, Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree, NCAA (Sept. 20, 2018), 
www.ncaa.org/about/flexibility-going-pro-and-getting-degree (describing NCAA-implemented changes 
geared toward providing men’s basketball student-athletes additional freedom and flexibility to decide about 
going pro or getting a college education) [hereinafter Going Pro].   
11.  Id.  One may note the irony in the NCAA permitting certain men’s basketball student-athletes to hire 
and receive benefits from agents when it was agents who were partly responsible for the corruption in the first 
place.  See Dan Wolken, NCAA Changes to College Basketball Seeking Reform are Mostly Cosmetic, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/columnist/dan-wolken/2018/08/08/ 
ncaa-college-basketball-reform-changes-mostly-cosmetic/938698002/ (arguing that permitting certain men’s 
basketball student-athletes to have agents does not address what is actually against rules: agents funneling 
money to teenage prospective student-athletes or to student-athletes while in college in exchange for becoming 
a client once they turn professional).  However, others believe the NCAA’s rules are the root cause of the 
entire scenario.  See Greene, supra note 4 (arguing that case was about the NCAA rules manual). 
12.  See Going Pro, supra note 10. 
13.  Id. 
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adopted.  While the NCAA recognized that its rule change regarding pre-
agreement benefits conflicted with the UAAA and relevant state laws, it failed 
to account for other ways in which its rule changes fail to fully align with the 
UAAA and RUAAA and state laws based on them.  When stating that the 
defendants’ NCAA rule-breaking conduct did not violate the law, Donnelly and 
the attorneys for the other defendants in the initial federal trial were surely 
focused on the federal laws at issue.  However, their blanket statements that their 
clients did not break the law failed to recognize that their clients’ actions not 
only broke NCAA rules but state laws based on the UAAA and RUAAA, too.   
Section II of this Article describes the federal investigation into, and legal 
proceedings regarding, corruption in men’s college basketball.  Section III 
details the background of the UAAA and RUAAA and applies their provisions 
to the actions of the various defendants in the previous and upcoming trials.  
This analysis reveals that the defendants’ actions triggered the application of 
state athlete-agent laws, which, if properly monitored and enforced, could prove 
an appropriate mechanism for deterring or addressing future similar instances.  
Section IV details the NCAA’s response to the federal investigation, which 
included revising rules applicable to men’s college basketball student-athletes.  
As the rules changes caused NCAA legislation to fall out of line with UAAA 
and RUAAA provisions, the Article concludes by suggesting revisions to the 
acts to align them with these rules changes.  
II. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING CORRUPTION IN MEN’S COLLEGE 
BASKETBALL 
One of the biggest stories in college sports history came to light in 
September 2017.14  Federal investigators turned the men’s college basketball 
world upside down when they made public a series of complaints depicting a 
thriving black market in which coaches, agents, financial advisors, and shoe and 
apparel company employees exploited naïve, young basketball student-
athletes.15  On September 26, 2017, the Acting United States Attorney for the 
 
14.  See Matt Norlander, Ultimate College Basketball Corruption Scandal Primer: Explaining the Latest 
with the FBI Probe, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/ 
ultimate-college-basketball-corruption-scandal-primer-explaining-the-latest-with-the-fbi-probe/ (providing 
timeline of events associated with investigation and charges). The FBI started investigating men’s college 
basketball after the Securities and Exchange Commission charged financial advisor Martin Blazer with fraud 
and Blazer informed the FBI that he could bring to light fraud and corruption in college basketball recruiting. 
15.  Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. Coaches, Adidas Executive Face Charges; Pitino’s Program Implicated, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/sports/ncaa-adidas-bribery.html (detailing 
officials’ announcement of charges and description of investigation); see Daniel Rapaport, FBI NCAA 
Basketball Investigation Details: What We Know, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 17, 2017, 
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Southern District of New York and the Assistant Director-in-Charge of the New 
York Office of the FBI announced the arrest of ten individuals.16  The 
complaints charged then-Adidas employees Gatto, Code, and Jonathan 
Augustine; athlete-advisors Dawkins, Muhish Sood, and Rashan Michel; and 
then-assistant men’s basketball coaches Lamont Evans (Oklahoma State 
University), Emanuel Richardson (University of Arizona), Tony Bland 
(University of Southern California), and Chuck Person (Auburn University) 
with wire fraud, bribery, travel act, and conspiracy offenses.17  The defendants, 
if convicted of the charges, faced maximum prison sentences between 80 and 
200 years.18 
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and FBI’s 
multiyear investigation revealed two related schemes in the dark underbelly of 
college basketball: the “Coach Bribery Scheme” and the “Adidas Scheme.”19   
A. Coach Bribery Scheme 
In the first scheme, athlete advisors Dawkins and Sood allegedly paid bribe 
money to assistant men’s college basketball coaches, and sometimes directly to 
current and prospective men’s college basketball student-athletes, facilitated by 
the coaches.20  In exchange for the payments, the coaches agreed to pressure and 
exert influence over student-athletes under their control to retain the services of 
 
https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2017/09/29/what-we-know-about-each-school-fbi-investigation 
(piecing together facts about investigation); see also Michael McCann, FBI College Basketball Corruption 
Scandal: Next Steps, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 26, 2017, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2017/ 
09/26/fbi-corruption-college-basketball-fraud-louisville-bribe (explaining how NCAA notion of amateurism 
is under attack).   
16.  Dep’t of Just., U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York Release, U.S. Attorney 
Announces the Arrest of 10 Individuals, Including Four Division I Coaches, for College Basketball Fraud and 
Corruption Schemes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-
attorney-announces-arrest-10-individuals-including-four-division-i-coaches-college (detailing investigation 
and charges resulting therefrom) [hereinafter Department of Justice].   
17.  See id. The Department of Justice release and complaints refer to some entities generically, but 
numerous individuals and media outlets have identified them (e.g., Adidas is “Company-1”). See also Jason 
Kirk and Ricky O’Donnell, FBI College Basketball Investigation: 18 Key Names to Know for Now, SBNATION 
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2017/9/27/16367814/ncaa-basketball-fbi-
investigation-coaches-agents-adidas.  The universities who employed the four assistant coaches have since 
terminated them.  See Norlander, supra note 14 (providing timeline of events associated with investigation 
and charges).  Authorities ultimately dropped the charges against Augustine.  See id. 
18.  See Department of Justice, supra note 16.   
19.  See id.; see also Tracy, supra note 15. 
20.  See Department of Justice, supra note 16.   
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the bribe-payers once the athletes entered the NBA.21  Dawkins, “a 20-
something upstart” and “linchpin” of the scandal, formerly worked for sports 
agent Andy Miller before going out on his own to start his own management 
company called LOYD (“Live Out Your Dreams”).22  The allegations against 
the four assistant coaches varied.23 
1. Allegations Against Now-Former Auburn Assistant Men’s Basketball 
Coach Chuck Person  
A thirteen-year NBA veteran, now-former Auburn assistant men’s 
basketball coach Chuck Person is the most prominent name among the 
defendants.24  Person accepted $91,500 in bribe payments arranged by Michel 
from a professional athlete financial advisor and business manager (the 
“advisor”) in exchange for agreeing to direct certain student-athletes to retain 
the services of the advisor.25  In helping further the advisor’s recruitment of 
 
21.  Id.  At trial, Dawkins contended that he did not want to pay assistant coaches because he did not 
believe they could influence student-athletes’ choices of agents, “By the time those kids get to college, the 
deals are usually done.  There’s no need to pay a college coach because these players are coming to college 
with agents.”  See Mark Schlabach and Jeff Borzello, Assistant: Miller Paid $10K Per Month to Ayton, ESPN 
(May 2, 2019), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/26647372/miller-paid-10k-per-month-
ayton (describing wiretapped call implicating University of Arizona head men’s basketball coach Sean 
Miller). 
22.  See Michael McCann, NCAA Corruption Trial: What to Expect in College Basketball Case, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, April 19, 2019, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/04/19/ncaa-corruption-recruiting-
trial-christian-
dawkins?utm_campaign=sinow&utm_medium=social&xid=socialflow_twitter_si&utm_source=twitter.com 
(previewing second trial); see also Gendry Estes, Who is Christian Dawkins and How is He Tied to NBA Agent 
Andy Miller?, LOUISVILLE COURIER J., Feb. 23, 2018, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/ 
kentucky/2018/02/23/christian-dawkins-nba-agent-andy-miller-college-basketball-recruiting/366449002/ 
(detailing Dawkins’s connections and role in scandal).  Miller, once considered one of the most powerful 
agents in professional basketball with a client list including stars Kristaps Porzingis, Kyle Lowry, Serge Ibaka, 
Dwight Howard, and Kevin Garnett, relinquished his agent certification in December 2017.  Id.  Authorities 
have not charged Miller, who many believe is cooperating with the government.  See Matt Norlander, College 
Basketball’s FBI Probe Gets Specific With Players, Teams Named in Report, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/college-basketballs-fbi-probe-gets-specific-with-
players-teams-named-in-report/ (describing content of documents obtained in raid of Miller’s office). 
23.  In one recorded meeting, Dawkins explained, “agents obvious (sic) have influence, but you gotta get 
the college coaches too . . . it’s almost like skipping a step if you just deal with agents.”  See McCann, supra 
note 15.  Authorities caught Dawkins on wiretap explaining that the path to securing commitments from 
college student-athletes went through assistant coaches, because head coaches “ain’t willing” to take bribes, 
“cause they’re making too much money.  And it’s too risky.”  See Tracy, supra note 15.   
24.  See Kirk, supra note 17. 
25.  See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).  The advisor is a 
cooperating witness for federal authorities.  See also Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing Person’s alleged 
involvement).   
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student-athletes he coached, Person arranged multiple meetings between them.26  
Person went so far as to lie to the mother of one student-athlete that the advisor 
was Person’s own personal financial advisor and also advised NBA Hall of 
Famer and Auburn alumnus Charles Barkley.27   
Person also gave $18,500 of the bribe money he received to the families of 
two student-athletes whom Person sought to steer to the advisor.28  Following 
news of the federal investigation, Auburn suspended men’s basketball student-
athletes Austin Wiley and Danjel Purifoy indefinitely.29  Later in the season, 
Auburn deemed Wiley and Purifoy ineligible for the remainder of the 2017-18 
season.30  In January 2018, the NCAA declared Wiley eligible for the 2018-19 
season, noting Auburn had self-reported NCAA violations involving 
impermissible recruiting, extra benefits, and agent-related activity.31  In March 
2018, the NCAA ruled that Purifoy would regain eligibility after sitting out the 
first 30 percent of the 2018-19 season due to concerns related to his connection 
to the federal investigation.32  
2. Allegations Against Now-Former Oklahoma State University Assistant 
Men’s Basketball Coach Lamont Evans  
Evans’s participation in the scheme was similar to that of Person.  Evans 
solicited $22,000 from two advisors—Sood and the same advisor with which 
Person was involved—in exchange for Evans’s agreement to exert his official 
 
26.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).   
27.  Id. (describing allegations against Person).   
28.  Id. (describing allegations against Person).   
29.  Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing investigation’s effects on Auburn University). 
30.  Mike Rutherford, How the FBI’s College Basketball Investigation Impacted Every School Involved, 
SBNATION (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/9/26/17905914/fbi-college-
basketball-investigation-every-school-recruiting-louisville-usc-arizona (detailing effects of investigation on 
involved universities).   
31. NCAA, Wiley Eligible for 2018-19 Season, NCAA (Jan. 11, 2018), www.ncaa.org/about/resources/ 
media-center/news/wiley-eligible-2018-19-season (disclosing Wiley’s eligibility decision). 
32.  ESPN, Auburn Forward Danjel Purifoy to Regain His Eligibility After First 30 Percent of Next 
Season, ESPN (Mar. 20, 2018), www.espn.in/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/22849959/auburn-forward-
danjel-purifoy-regain-eligibility-first-30-percent-next-season (describing NCAA decision regarding Purifoy’s 
eligibility).  Auburn’s men’s basketball program, thanks in part to contributions from Purifoy and Wiley, 
enjoyed its best season in program history in 2018-19, winning 30 games, winning its first Southeastern 
Conference tournament championship since 1985, and advancing to its first-ever Final Four.  See Josh Vitale, 
Looking Ahead to What Auburn Could Lose, Return and Add Next Basketball Season, MONTGOMERY 
ADVERTISER, Apr. 9, 2019, https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/sports/college/auburn/2019/04/09/ 
looking-ahead-what-auburn-basketball-could-lose-return-add-next-season-harper-wiley-okeke-nba-
draft/3408435002/ (summarizing Auburn’s season and looking ahead to next season).  Wiley may test NBA 
draft waters and forego his senior season of eligibility while Purifoy already announced he would return next 
season for his senior year of eligibility.  See id. 
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influence over student-athletes he coached to retain the advisors’ services once 
those student-athletes entered the NBA.33  Evans also received bribe payments 
from Dawkins when the former coached at the University of South Carolina.34   
To assist Sood and the advisor recruit the student-athletes he coached, Evans 
arranged meetings for them with student-athletes.35  Evans also falsely touted 
the services of Sood and the advisor to student-athletes and their families, telling 
one student-athlete, for example, that the manager was Evans’s “guy,” and 
promising that, “[i]t’s going to benefit you.  I promise you that.”36 
Oklahoma State announced in November 2017 it would withhold its top 
player, Jeffrey Carroll, from competitions pending review of the program.37  
Carroll missed three games before Oklahoma State cleared him to return.38 
3. Allegations Against Now-Former University of Arizona Assistant Men’s 
Basketball Coach Emanuel Richardson 
Richardson accepted $20,000 in bribes from Dawkins, Sood, and two 
undercover law enforcement agents posing as financial backers of the advisor 
in exchange for Richardson’s commitment to steer student-athletes he coached 
to retain Dawkins and Sood’s services upon entering the NBA.39  With respect 
to one particular student-athlete he coached, Richardson assured Dawkins and 
Sood that Richardson was the individual who the student-athlete trusted.40  
Richardson facilitated at least one meeting between Dawkins, Sood, and a 
representative of a student-athlete for the purpose of the representative 
committing the student-athlete to retain Dawkins and Sood’s services.41   
Richardson kept some of the bribe money and gave some to a recruit 
believed to be class of 2018 prospective student-athlete Jahvon Quinerly.42  
 
33.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Evans). 
34.  Id.; see Rapaport, supra note 15. 
35.  See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Evans). 
36.  Id. 
37.  Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing effects of federal investigation on implicated universities). 
38.  ESPN, Oklahoma State Clears Cowboys Guard Jeffrey Carroll to Play, ESPN (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/21490727/oklahoma-state-clears-cowboys-guard-jeffrey-
carroll-play (describing Oklahoma State announcement of Carroll’s pending return).   
39.  See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Richardson).  Note the 
absence of Code from the allegations regarding Richardson, as the University of Arizona is a Nike-sponsored 
school.  See also Rapaport, supra note 15. 
40.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Richardson).   
41.  Id. 
42.  Rapaport, supra note 15. 
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Amidst the federal investigation, Quinerly decommitted from attending Arizona 
and ultimately enrolled at Villanova University.43 
4. Allegations Against Now-Former University of Southern California Assistant 
Men’s Basketball Coach Tony Bland 
Bland accepted $13,000 in bribes from Dawkins and Sood in exchange for 
Bland’s agreement to exert influence over student-athletes Bland coached to 
retain Dawkins and Sood’s services once the student-athletes entered the 
NBA.44  In fact, Bland told Dawkins and Sood, “I definitely can get the players 
. . . . And I can definitely mold the players and put them in the lap of you guys.”45   
At Bland’s direction, Dawkins and Sood paid or facilitated the payment of 
an additional $9,000 directly to the families of two student-athletes.46  The 
media has identified these two student-athletes as now-former USC men’s 
basketball student-athlete De’Anthony Melton and prospective student-athlete 
Taeshon Cherry.47  In return, Bland facilitated a meeting between Dawkins and 
Sood and one of Melton’s relatives.48 
B. Adidas Scheme 
In the second scheme, athlete advisors Dawkins, Sood, and Augustine, 
working with high-level Adidas executives including Gatto, allegedly paid or 
conspired to pay bribes to student-athletes playing at, or recruited by, certain 
universities, or to their families.49 Gatto and Code, who was at one time 
affiliated with Adidas, paid the bribes in exchange for a commitment by the 
athletes to matriculate at specific Adidas-sponsored universities, sign with 
Adidas upon turning professional, and a promise to ultimately sign 
representation agreements with the bribe-payors once the athletes entered the 
 
43.  Ryan Kelapire, Former Arizona Commit Jahvon Quinerly Disgruntled at Villanova?, SBNATION 
(Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.azdesertswarm.com/basketball/2018/12/11/18137174/jahvon-quinerly-
villanova-disgruntled-arizona-commit-fbi-investigation-recruiting (describing timeline of Quinerly’s 
university selection process).  Quinerly has played sparingly this season and recently commented on his 
Instagram, “was my 2nd choice for a reason,” perhaps indicating he is unhappy at Villanova.  Id. 
44.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Bland).   
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Mark Schlabach, Ex-USC Assistant Tony Bland Reaches Plea Deal in Hoops Scandal Case, ESPN 
(Dec. 20, 2018), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/25582237/former-usc-trojans-assistant-
tony-bland-reaches-plea-deal-hoops-scandal-case (explaining current status of case involving Bland).   
48.  See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Bland).   
49.  Id. (describing Company-1 scheme).   
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NBA.50 The allegations include multiple prospective student-athletes and 
universities. 
1. Allegations Involving Then-Prospective Student-Athlete Brian Bowen and 
the University of Louisville 
Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Sood worked together to funnel $100,000 from 
Adidas to the family of then-high school basketball student-athlete Brian Bowen 
in exchange for the Bowen’s commitment to both play at the University of 
Louisville and retain Dawkins and Sood upon entering the NBA.51  Now-former 
Louisville men’s basketball head coach Rick Pitino requested that Dawkins 
make the payments.52  Because the payments violated both NCAA rules and 
federal legislation, Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Sood used fake purchase orders, 
invoices, and related documents to try and disguise the payments.53 
Louisville suspended Bowen from the team indefinitely following the 
allegations and ultimately released him from his scholarship.54  Bowen, who 
never played a college game, entered the 2018 NBA draft pool but teams did 
not consider him a viable prospect.55  Bowen now plays in Australia and recently 
brought a lawsuit against Adidas and some of its employees and consultants 
based on alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) Act.56  In large part due to the events surrounding Bowen, 
Louisville fired Pitino and its athletic director at the time, Tom Jurich.57 
 
50.  Id. 
51.  See id. (describing allegations against Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Sood).  The complaints did not 
mention Bowen or Louisville by name but several media outlets identified them as the relevant parties, and 
Louisville confirmed its involvement in the investigation.  See also The Courier-Journal, University of 
Louisville Scandal: Brian Bowen’s Mom Says She ‘Didn’t Know Anything,’ LOUISVILLE COURIER J., Sept. 
27, 2017, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2017/09/26/university-louisville-
recruits-college-basketball-scandal/703820001/ (detailing University of Louisville’s alleged involvement in 
scandal). 
52.  See Thomas Novelly, 1,300 Calls Part of Evidence in FBI’s College Basketball Investigation,  
LOUISVILLE COURIER J., Dec. 21, 2017, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/ 
2017/12/21/fbi-college-basketball-investigation-university-louisville/973195001/(describing investigation, 
specifically as it pertained to Louisville). 
53.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Sood).   
54.  Novelly, supra note 52 (describing Bowen’s current status). 
55.  Matt Norlander, Former Louisville Recruit Brian Bowen Sues Adidas and Wants it to Stop Sponsoring 
College Basketball, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
basketball/news/former-louisville-recruit-brian-bowen-sues-adidas-and-wants-it-to-stop-sponsoring-college-
basketball/ (detailing Bowen’s lawsuit against Adidas). 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
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2. Allegations Involving Prospective Student-Athlete Balsa Koprivica and the 
University of Louisville 
Dawkins and Augustine agreed to facilitate payments to the family of a high 
school basketball student-athlete believed to be class of 2019 prospect Balsa 
Koprivica in exchange for his commitment to play at Louisville and ultimately 
retain Dawkins’s services.58  Recruiting analysts rank Koprivica, who is 
originally from Serbia, as a top prospect in the 2019 high school class.59  Upon 
implication in the federal probe, Koprivica’s Florida high school withheld him 
from competition pending investigation to ensure his actions did not violate state 
high school athletics regulations.60  Koprivica has since verbally committed to 
attend Florida State University.61 
3. Allegations Involving Prospective Student-Athlete Nassir Little and the 
University of Miami 
Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Augustine agreed to attempt to make payments 
totaling as much as $150,000 from Adidas to prospective student-athlete Nassir 
Little in order to secure his commitment to Adidas-sponsored University of 
Miami.62  In exchange for the payment, Little would commit to both retaining 
Dawkins’s services and signing with Adidas once he entered the NBA.63  Little 
 
58.  See id.  The complaints did not mention Louisville or Koprivica by name but several media outlets 
identified them as the relevant parties, and Louisville confirmed its involvement in the investigation.  See 
Gentry Estes, Louisville Recruiting Scandal: Did Documents Reveal Player 11?, LOUISVILLE COURIER J., 
Aug. 30, 2018, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2018/08/30/louisville-
recruiting-scandal-player-11-revealed-documents/1141432002/ (piecing together facts that identify relevant 
prospective student-athlete).   
59.  See Buddy Collings, Balsa Koprivica Sits, Watches, Waits for Word on FBI Basketball Probe, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2017, https://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/highschool/os-sp-hs-balsa-
koprivica-sits-20171121-story.html (describing allegations involving Koprivica and current status with his 
high school team). 
60.  Id. (noting that Koprivica and his mother deny wrongdoing). 
61.  MVA Basketball Athlete Balsa Koprivica Commits to FSU, MONTVERDE ACAD. (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://mvasports.com/news/2018/10/29/boys-basketball-mva-basketball-athlete-balsa-koprivica-commits-
to-fsu.aspx (describing Koprivica’s verbal commitment and talents). 
62.  See Dep’t of Justice, supra note 16.  The complaints did not mention Miami or Little by name but 
several media outlets identified them as the relevant parties, and Miami confirmed its involvement in the 
investigation.  See also Rapaport, supra note 15.  Trial evidence included text messages between Augustine 
and Dawkins that revealed that the Little family was not interested in receiving any money, clearing the family 
of wrongdoing.  See also Mike Rutherford, 5 Winners and 7 Losers From the Big College Basketball 
Corruption Verdict, SBNATION (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/10/ 
24/18009130/college-basketball-trial-winners-and-losers-arizona-louisville-duke-lsu (identifying perceived 
winners and losers from the initial trial’s outcome).   
63.  Dep’t of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Gatto, Code, Dawkins, and Augustine). 
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ended up committing to attend and play basketball for the University of North 
Carolina.64   
Little averaged just under ten points and five rebounds per game for the Tar 
Heels as a freshman in 2018-19.65  Shortly after the conclusion of his freshman 
season Little declared for the NBA draft, hired an agent, and stated he will not 
return for his sophomore season.66 
4. Superseding Indictment Against Gatto, Code, and Dawkins 
In April 2018, federal authorities released a superseding indictment against 
Gatto, Code, and Dawkins.67  This indictment expanded the scope of the charged 
wire fraud conspiracy to include alleged payments to the families of six student-
athletes in connection with their decisions to attend four universities—the 
University of Louisville, the University of Miami, the University of Kansas, and 
North Carolina State University.68  Adidas sponsored all four universities.69 
The superseding indictment contains additional details on how the 
defendants steered, with tens of thousands of dollars, student-athletes to the 
universities.70  For example, while unnamed in official records, multiple media 
outlets reported that Code and Dawkins engaged in wire fraud to ensure that 
highly coveted athletes Silvio De Sousa and Billy Preston enrolled at the 
University of Kansas.71   
 
64.  Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing effects of federal allegations on University of Miami).   
65.  Brett Friedlander, UNC Freshman Little Declares for NBA Draft, N. ST. J., April 1, 2019, 
https://nsjonline.com/article/2019/04/unc-freshman-little-declares-for-nba-draft/ (describing Little’s 
freshman season and decision to enter draft).   
66.  Id. 
67.  See Dep’t of Just., U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York Release, U.S. Attorney’s 
Office Announced Additional Charges Against Athletic Apparel Company Executive and Others for Allegedly 
Defrauding Four NCAA Division I Universities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (April 10, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-s-office-announces-additional-charges-against-athletic-
apparel-company (announcing filing of Superseding Indictment) [hereinafter Superseding Indictment].   
68.  Id. (describing allegations in Superseding Indictment). 
69.  See id. 
70.  See Norlander, supra note 14 (updating effects of charges on college basketball).  Authorities dropped 
Sood from the superseding indictment, indicating he cooperated with authorities.  See Aaron Moody, NCAA 
College Basketball Fraud Scandal: FBI Investigation Info, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 4, 2018, 
https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/article208880939.html (describing investigation, relevant individuals, 
and theories of case).  In fact, Sood reached a plea deal with federal prosecutors in which he pled guilty to 
three felonies and agreed to testify against other defendants.  See Mark Schlabach, Munish Sood Pleads Guilty 
in NCAA Basketball Corruption Case, ESPN (Aug. 31, 2018),  https://www.espn.com/mens-college-
basketball/story/_/id/24539543/munish-sood-pleads-guilty-ncaa-basketball-corruption-case (detailing Sood’s 
plea deal). 
71.  Norlander, supra note 14. 
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Two federal trials regarding corruption in men’s college basketball took 
place.  Throughout their fall 2018 trial on charges related to the alleged “Adidas 
Scheme,” Gatto, Code, and Dawkins admitted they violated NCAA rules in 
order to induce prospective student-athletes to attend Adidas-sponsored schools; 
however, each denied committing federal crimes.72  The jury heard testimony 
detailing gas station meetups, cash-stuffed magazines, secret “bat phones,” and 
sham invoices.73  Testimony implicated, or at the very least mentioned, high-
profile schools like Kansas, Louisville, Arizona, NC State, LSU, DePaul, Duke, 
Kentucky, and North Carolina.74   
A New York jury unanimously convicted Gatto, Code, and Dawkins of wire 
fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud.75  Prosecutors won because they 
convinced the jury that the defendants paid top men’s basketball prospects 
thousands of dollars to attend certain Adidas-sponsored universities in violation 
of NCAA rules.76  Intending to send “a great big warning light to the basketball 
world,” a judge sentenced Gatto to nine months in prison and Code and Dawkins 
six months in prison apiece.77  Attorneys for Gatto and Dawkins indicated their 
clients will appeal.78   
The second trial, which particularly garnered attention from men’s college 
basketball’s coaching fraternity, pertained to the alleged “Coach Bribery 
Scheme.”79 Prosecutors alleged that Dawkins and Code bribed a number of 
 
72.   Jones, supra note 6. 
73.  Danielle Lerner, College Basketball FBI Trial: Verdict Sets Tone for Future, LOUISVILLE COURIER 
J., Oct. 19, 2018, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2018/10/19/college-
basketball-recruiting-fbi-investigation-trial-verdict-sets-tone-future-cases/1682044002/ (describing 
testimony and evidence presented at trial).   
74.  Id. 
75.  Michael McCann, Why the Prosecution Won in the College Hoops Corruption Trial and What’s Next, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/10/24/ncaa-corruption-
fbi-trial-verdict-analysis (explaining trial outcome and likely outcomes); see Tracy, supra note 5 (describing 
trial outcome). 
76.  See McCann, supra note 75 (noting that those in the basketball and apparel industries knew of this 
practice for decades). 
77.  Christian Red, Three Men Sentenced to Prison for Role in FBI College Basketball Corruption Case, 
USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2019/03/05/fbi-college-basketball-
trial-prison-sentences-handed-out-three-men/3067964002/ (describing March 2019 sentencing of three 
defendants).   
78.  Tracy, supra note 5 (explaining initial trial’s outcome and its lack of effects on everyday operations 
in men’s college basketball); see Jones, supra note 6 (noting that appeal timeline is undetermined). 
79.  See Matt Norlander, Christian Dawkins’ Compelling and Contention Testimony vs. Prosecutors 
Highlights College Hoops Federal Case, CBS SPORTS (May 2, 2019), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
basketball/news/christian-dawkins-compelling-and-contentious-testimony-vs-prosecutors-highlights-
college-hoops-federal-case/ (describing Dawkins’s testimony). 
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assistant coaches, including Bland, Richardson, Evans, Creighton assistant 
coach Preston Murphy, and TCU assistant coach Corey Barker.80  Jurors in the 
second trial returned guilty verdicts on two (of six) charges faced by Dawkins 
and on one (of four) charges faced by Code.81  Jurors convicted Dawkins of 
bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery while they convicted Code of 
conspiracy to commit bribery82.  Jurors found Dawkins and Code not guilty on 
charges of wire fraud and conspiracy to violate the travel act and, in the case of 
Code, not guilty on a bribery charge.83  Sentencing will occur at a later date.84  
While Dawkins and Code face maximum prison sentences measured in years, 
in reality those sentences will likely last a few months each.85 
In the meantime, all four assistant coaches reached plea agreements with 
federal prosecutors.86  Bland pled guilty to one count of federal funds bribery, 
for which the punishment could range from probation to a one-year prison 
sentence.87  In April 2019, Bland received a sentence of two years of probation 
and 100 hours of community service for his involvement in the scandal.88  
Richardson pled guilty to one count of federal funds bribery and faces up to two 
 
80.  See Michael McCann, What’s Next for Sean Miller, Arizona After the Final Week of the College 
Basketball Corruption Trial?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 3, 2019,  https://www.si.com/college-basketball/ 
2019/05/03/college-basketball-corruption-trial-christian-dawkins-merl-code-arizona-university-legal-
takeways (describing second trial). 
81.  Michael McCann, Federal Prosecutors Get Underwhelming Win in Second College Hoops Corruption 
Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 8, 2019, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/05/08/corruption-
trial-christian-dawkins-merl-code-guilty-verdicts?utm_source=twitter.com/&utm_medium=social&utm_ 
campaign=sinow&xid=socialflow_twitter_si (describing results of second trial and characterizing verdicts as 
a win for prosecutors but not a knockout).   
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Larry Neumeister, 2 Convicted in College Basketball Corruption Trial, STAR TRIBUNE, May 8, 2019, 
www.startribune.com/2-convicted-in-college-basketball-corruption-trial/509651602/ (detailing outcome of 
second trial). 
86.  Larry Neumeister, Ex-Auburn Assistant Chuck Person Pleads Guilty in Basketball Bribery Scandal, 
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, March 19, 2019, https://tucson.com/sports/ex-auburn-assistant-chuck-person-pleads-
guilty-in-basketball-bribery/article_2bc3da9e-4a94-11e9-a03e-1395946c7141.html (detailing Person’s plea 
deal).   
87.  Joey Kaufman, Former USC Assistant Tony Bland Reaches Plea Deal in College Basketball 
Corruption Case, ORANGE CTY. REG., Dec. 20, 2018, https://www.ocregister.com/2018/12/20/former-usc-
assistant-tony-bland-reaches-plea-deal-in-college-basketball-corruption-case/ (detailing Bland’s plea deal). 
88.  Emily Carton, Ex-USC Assistant Tony Bland Sentenced in College Basketball Corruption Trial, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 5, 2019), https://www. si.com/college/2019/06/05/former-usc-assistant-tony-
bland-sentenced-college-basketball-corruption-trial. 
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years in prison.89  Evans pled guilty to a federal conspiracy bribery charge, 
admitting he received $22,000 to steer student-athletes he coached to certain 
financial advisors and business managers.90  Evans, a citizen of Barbados, faces 
not only up to two years in prison but also the possibility of deportation.91  
Person pleaded guilty to a bribery conspiracy charge, which typically carries a 
prison sentence of two to two and a half years.92  Person admitted to accepting 
$91,500 in bribes to steer players to a financial adviser and will forfeit that 
amount as part of the plea.93  In all, ten men were found guilty or accepted plea 
deals.94 
D. Aftermath of Trials 
Many wonder whether the guilty verdicts in the initial trial will effect what 
is widely considered business as usual in college basketball.95  Some believe 
that, despite the guilty verdicts that laid bare the open secret of the vast influence 
of apparel companies in men’s college basketball, basketball operators continue 
to connect families of valuable prospects with money in violation of NCAA 
 
89.  Alexis Mansanarez, Former Arizona Assistant Book Richardson Reaches Plea Deal in Bribery Case, 
SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-basketball/news/ncaa-mens-
basketball-news-former-arizona-wildcats-assistant-book-richardson-reaches-plea-deal-in-federal-bribery-
case/14fnc4i27ut4m1geflby4c1qt1 (describing Richardson’s plea deal).  
90.  ESPN News Services, Lamont Evans Pleads Guilty to Bribery Charge, ESPN (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/25885440/lamont-evans-pleads-guilty-bribery-
charge  (describing proceedings involving Evans). 
91.  Id. (quoting Evans, “I now know that accepting those funds in exchange for introducing them to any 
one player was wrong and violated the law.”). 
92.  Neumeister, supra note 86 (detailing Person’s plea deal and noting Person’s sentencing will occur in 
July 2019).   
93.  Id. 
94.  Pat Forde, Pete Thamel, & Dan Wetzel, Can NCAA Handle Hoops Scandal?  ‘It’s Time to Get This 
Right,’ YAHOO! SPORTS (May 9, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/can-ncaa-handle-hoops-scandal-its-time-to-
get-this-right-173558292.html?soc?src=social-sh&soc_trk=tw (anticipating NCAA investigation). 
95.  Tracy, supra note 5 (explaining initial trial’s outcome and its lack of effects on everyday operations 
in men’s college basketball); see Ben Gamble, How Did College Basketball Land in Federal Court and Where 
Does it Go from Here?, ST. LOUIS U. L. J., https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2018-19/college-
basketball-federal-court.php (predicting aftermath of initial federal trial); see also Will Hobson, Charges 
Involving Kansas, N.C. State Make It Clear: FBI Is Enforcing NCAA Rules, WASH. POST, April 13, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/latest-college-basketball-charges-make-it-clear-the-fbi-is-
enforcing-ncaa-rules/2018/04/13/d49e40f4-3e8e-11e8d53-eba0ed237; see also Dan Wetzel, How One 
Basketball Middleman Exposed College Amateurism and Clowned the FBI, YAHOO! SPORTS (May 1, 2019), 
https://sports.yahoo.com/how-christian-dawkins-exposed-college-amateurism-231944769.html (describing 
Dawkins’s testimony in second trial); see also Dan Wetzel, FBI Surveillance Videos Show How College 
Athletics Is a Cesspool, But NCAA Doesn’t Care Enough to Watch, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://sports.yahoo.com/fbi-surveillance-videos-show-corruption-everywhere-in-college-athletics-
210716764.html (noting that NCAA power players did not come view trial). 
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amateurism rules.96  For example, Syracuse University head men’s basketball 
coach Jim Boeheim stated, “The verdict doesn’t mean anything.  What’s there 
is there.  What’s there is not good . . . . They broke an awful lot of NCAA rules.  
I’m not sure they broke the law.”97   
However, contrary to both Boeheim’s thoughts and defense attorney Casey 
Donnelly’s claim in opening statements of the initial trial, the cases serve as 
precedent that violating NCAA legislation can result in consequences beyond 
NCAA penalties.98  Further, U.S. District Court Judge Loretta A. Preska rejected 
Person’s argument in a pretrial motion that the federal government was 
attempting to make federal crimes out of unreported NCAA rules violations.99  
Anyone associated with men’s college basketball who tries to bribe others not 
only has to worry about possible adverse NCAA and employment 
consequences, but the far worse prospect of a prison sentence.100  
Those who feel that the trials will not change the underground landscape of 
men’s college basketball note the lack of charges against head coaches.101  
Defense attorneys subpoenaed Louisiana State University (“LSU”) head men’s 
 
96.  Tracy, supra note 5; see Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, New Pressures, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 26, 2018), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/26/guilty-verdict-college-basketball-corruption-trial-puts-
new-pressure-ncaa (describing outcomes of initial federal trials); see also Sam Mellinger, The Shame of the 
NCAA’s Handling of Kansas Basketball Player Silvio De Sousa, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 2, 2019, 
https://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columns-blogs/sam-mellinger/article223798645.html (explaining that 
NCAA was embarrassed when its sausage-making secrets went public); see also Andy Staples, What Has the 
NCAA—or Anyone—Learned from the College Basketball Black Market’s Time on Trial?, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, May 9, 2019, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/05/09/ncaa-trial-fbi-bribery-
corruption-mark-emmert?utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=social-share-
article&utm_content=20190509 (contending that federal investigation and tax dollars spent on it netted “A 
fart in a stiff wind”).   
97.  Luke Decock, Guilty Verdicts Irrelevant to NCAA’s Task Ahead, But This May Offer Impetus for 
Action, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/article220559155.html 
(predicting NCAA’s actions in light of verdict).  Some believe the defendants should not have been prosecuted 
in the first place, as the prosecutions raised the question of overcriminalization; in other words, prosecutors 
misused the law in an attempt to solve a societal ill and punish a paltry iniquity.  See Sally Jenkins, As Next 
College Basketball Corruption Trial Begins, It’s Time to Ask: Is This Worth It?, WASH. POST, April 21, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/as-next-college-basketball-corruption-trial-begins-its-time-
to-ask-is-this-worth-it/2019/04/19/8eb429da-62ca-11e9-bfad-36a7eb36cb60_story.html?utm_term=.2ab1d6 
e4695c (questioning propriety of prosecuting Code and Dawkins). 
98.  See Tracy, supra note 5 (quoting former Big 12 commissioner Dan Beebe, “Now you don’t just have 
to worry about what the NCAA does to you—you have to worry about going to jail.”). 
99.  Mark Schlabach, Charges from FBI’s College Corruption Investigation to Remain, ESPN (Jan. 4, 
2019), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/25677971/federal-charges-college-corruption-
probe-go-forward (describing outcome of hearing on Person’s motion seeking dismissal). 
100.  McCann, supra note 80 (adding that this additional deterrence could dissuade some from partaking 
in wrongdoing).   
101.  Id.; see Billy Witz, Who’s on Trial in the College Basketball Scandal? Not the Big Names, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 23, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/23/sports/college-basketball-trial-arizona-
lsu.html. 
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basketball coach Will Wade and University of Arizona head men’s basketball 
coach Sean Miller to testify at the second trial.102  Defense attorneys hoped to 
elicit testimony including discussion of Wade’s alleged phone conversation with 
Dawkins in which Wade speaks freely about a “strong ass offer” he made to a 
prospective student-athlete, likely Javonte Smart, who ultimately enrolled at 
LSU and played for Wade.103  When news of the scandal broke, reports linked 
Miller to Dawkins through phone records.104  Specifically, media scrutinized the 
University of Arizona’s recruitment of DeAndre Ayton, who played at Arizona 
for a year before entering the NBA draft, in which the Phoenix Suns selected 
him as the first overall pick.105  However, a judge, on a motion by prosecutors, 
ruled that the anticipated testimony describing Dawkins’s relationship and 
interactions with both Wade and Miller was irrelevant and thus they did not have 
to testify.106   
Federal authorities recently gave the NCAA the green light to proceed with 
investigating potential NCAA rules violations.107  Many, however, grow 
 
102.  Pat Forde et al., Exclusive: Wiretap Reveals LSU Coach Will Wade Discussed Recruiting “Offer” 
with Hoops Scandal Middleman, YAHOO! SPORTS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/exclusive-
wiretap-reveals-lsu-coach-will-wade-discussed-recruiting-offer-hoops-scandal-middleman-175046487.html 
(describing Wade’s alleged role in scandal).   
103.  Id. LSU suspended Wade after he declined to speak with university officials as part of the 
investigation into the wiretapped phone conversation between Wade and Dawkins. See Charlotte Carroll, Will 
Wade Reinstated by LSU After Meeting with School, NCAA Officials, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 14, 2019, 
https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2019/04/14/lsu-reinstated-head-coach-will-wade-recruiting-scandal 
(describing circumstances surrounding Wade’s suspension and reinstatement). LSU reinstated Wade a little 
more than a month later after he met with university and NCAA officials. See id. 
104.  Glenn Guilbeau, Report: LSU’s Will Wade, Arizona’s Sean Miller Face Subpoenas in FBI 
Corruption Case, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2019/02/26/ 
sean-miller-will-wade-subpoena-fbi-basketball-corruption-case/2989524002/ (describing circumstances 
leading to subpoenas for Miller and Davis). 
105.  Id.  Jurors heard an FBI-intercepted call between Dawkins and Richardson during which Richardson 
told Dawkins that Miller was paying, or had promised to pay, $10,000 a month for Ayton.  See Pete Thamel 
and Dan Wetzel, Wiretaps Played in Federal Court Allege Arizona’s Sean Miller Paid Players, YAHOO! 
SPORTS (May 1, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/arizona-sean-miller-paid-players-wiretaps-federal-hoops-
corruption-case-153718418.html (describing trial ongoings implicating Miller). Miller denies any 
wrongdoing. See id. 
106.  Jason Owens, Sean Miller, Will Wade Won’t Testify in College Hoops Corruption Trial; Wiretaps 
Won’t Be Heard, YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 19, 2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/sean-miller-will-wade-wont-
testify-in-hoops-corruption-trial-wiretaps-wont-be-heard-201612772.html (describing judge’s ruling).  The 
decision on Miller and Wade sparked cynicism among the coaching community. See Pat Forde et al., Judge’s 
Ruling Rocks College Hoops World: ‘I Should Have Cheated My Whole Career,’ YAHOO! SPORTS (Apr. 19, 
2019), https://sports.yahoo.com/judges-ruling-rocks-college-hoops-world-i-should-have-cheated-my-whole-
career-234403238.html (describing judge’s decision and reactions to it).  “If these guys get away with it,” one 
veteran head coach said, “I should have cheated my whole career.” See id. 
107.  Gamble, supra note 95.  The NCAA Enforcement Staff provided a verbal notice of inquiry to the 
University of Louisville in March 2019.  See Tim Sullivan, Louisville Recieves NCAA Notice of Inquiry; 
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increasingly frustrated with the NCAA’s enforcement of its rules, especially 
considering it was federal authorities, not the NCAA, who discovered the 
NCAA rules-violating actions in the first place.108  More than fifty schools have 
at least been named in one form or fashion via federal documents, court 
evidence, testimony, or original reporting.109 
III. UAAA AND RUAAA BACKGROUND AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE 
DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS 
A. UAAA and RUAAA Background 
The Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”), also known as the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, provides states with non-
partisan legislation that attempts to bring clarity and stability to critical areas of 
state statutory law.110  Recognizing that an agent’s recruitment of an enrolled 
student-athlete can lead to eligibility problems for both the student-athlete and 
university, severe economic sanctions, and loss of scholarships, the ULC drafted 
the UAAA in 2000 to govern relations among student-athletes, athlete-agents, 
and universities.111  Thus, the UAAA protects the interests of student-athletes 
and universities by regulating athlete-agents and their actions.112  Some say that, 
in protecting these interests, UAAA drafters focused solely on deterring athlete-
 
Mack, Brown Jr. Respond, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/ 
sports/college/louisville/2019/04/10/university-louisville-receives-notice-inquiry/3429881002/ (describing 
response to notice).  The allegations against the four assistant coaches, if true, could results in the NCAA 
Enforcement Staff charging the assistant coaches with violations of NCAA legislation including Bylaw 11.1.3, 
which prohibits athletics department staff members from: (1) representing an individual in the marketing of 
his athletics ability or reputation to an agent and (2) receiving compensation or gratuities for same. See NCAA 
Manual 2018-19, supra note 7, at § 11.1.3. While reports have not directly implicated the head coaches at 
these four universities, NCAA rules presume responsibility for head coaches for major violations of NCAA 
legislation within their programs.  See generally Josh Lens, NCAA Head Coach Responsibilities Legislation, 
14 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. 33 (2018) (detailing NCAA head coach responsibilities legislation and its application 
and providing recommendations for head coaches to consider implementing to mitigate likelihood of 
allegation or finding).   
108.  See McCann, supra note 15 (noting that NCAA lacks both resources and, as a private actor, subpoena 
power); see also Norlander, supra note 79 (noting that it took a 26-year old runner and convicted felon to 
voice truth to problems facing men’s college basketball). 
109.  Forde, supra note 94 (noting that more than half the programs from the seven most prominent 
conferences have been associated with activity that could draw scrutiny). 
110.  REVISED UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, About UCL (UNIF. LAW COMM’N. 2015), [hereinafter 
RUAAA] available at https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx? 
DocumentFileKey=6a97db74-446e-e102-f517-0bd54fbb7ff4&forceDialog=0 (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) 
(describing ULC and its functions). 
111.  Id. at 1 (providing reasons for drafting the UAAA).   
112.  Id.   
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agents from encouraging amateur athletes to turn professional or accept money 
in violation of NCAA rules.113  Forty-two states enacted the UAAA.114   
On its website, the NCAA states it “supports the Uniform Athlete Agents 
Act (UAAA) and its adoption in every state…. The UAAA is an important tool 
in regulating the activities of athlete agents and protecting NCAA student-
athletes and member institutions.”115  In fact, the NCAA’s website includes a 
page entitled, “Need For and Benefits of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act 
(UAAA).”116  
As time passed, several states amended their respective acts to deal with a 
perceived lack of enforcement, broaden coverage of the act, and require notice 
to educational institutions prior to an agent contacting an enrolled student-
athlete.117  Variations between states put uniformity at risk and may have 
discouraged reputable agents from complying with the UAAA.118  To address 
these issues and modernize the UAAA in an ever-evolving sports commercial 
marketplace, the ULC drafted the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act 
(“RUAAA”) in July 2015.119   
Fourteen states have enacted the RUAAA, and nine other states introduced 
it in 2019.120  Further, dozens of college athletics administrators and coaches 
voiced support for and urged adoption of the RUAAA in a memo to officials 
who work with legislators in each state.121  Among the 55 individuals who 
signed the memo are 16 athletic directors at Autonomy Five conference schools; 
 
113.  Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA and Sparta: How America Should Reform 
its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 169 (2013) 
(explaining that “groupthink” led to this approach as no drafter had participated in college or professional 
sports).   
114.  ATHLETE AGENTS ACT, REVISED, Enactment Map: Description, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Communitykey=4d46906c-2d24-4ede-84ab-
a57b40fa5c37&tab-groupdetails (last visited Feb. 11, 2019) (providing interactive map detailing individual 
states’ adoptions of athlete-agent laws) [hereinafter RUAAA Map]. 
115.  NCAA, Agents and Amateurism, NCAA, www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2019) (describing the UAAA and NCAA’s support of it). 
116.  NCAA, Need For and Benefits of the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA), NCAA, 
www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism/need-and-benefits-uniform-athlete-agents-act-uaaa (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2019) (listing benefits of UAAA) [hereinafter NCAA Need For and Benefits of the UAAA]. 
117.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 2 (explaining reasons behind drafting of the RUAAA). 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id; see Why Your State Should Adopt the Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2015), UNIF. LAW 
COMM‘N,  
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=a59a2
fe8-009d-fdab-dcb1-402b39176bb3&forceDialog=0 (last visited April 25, 2019) (detailing benefits of 
RUAAA). 
120.  RUAAA Map, supra note 114.   
121.  Aaron Beard, Schools, Coaches Push for Adoption of Strengthened Agent Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/273a069e034d4a12ab0bd8f6c67e01f3 (detailing memo).   
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NFL agents Jack Bechta, Bus Cook, and Bruce and Ryan Tollner; and coaching 
figures including University of Connecticut head women’s basketball coach 
Geno Auriemma, University of Virginia head football coach Bronco 
Mendenhall, now-former Louisiana State University (and current University of 
Kansas) head football coach Les Miles, former University of Nebraska head 
football coach Tom Osborne, Florida State University head football coach 
Willie Taggart, and University of North Carolina head men’s basketball coach 
Roy Williams.122  With the support of these administrators and coaches, Dale G. 
Higer, an Idaho attorney who helped draft the RUAAA, hopes over half of the 
states adopt it by 2020.123  Of note is the fact that, in light of the federal 
investigation and cases involving men’s college basketball, Southeastern 
Conference Commissioner Greg Sankey recently reiterated that states should 
have a role in pursuing these cases.124 
B. Application of UAAA and RUAAA Provisions to the Defendants’ Actions 
The NCAA, college athletics administrators, coaches, and agents support 
the UAAA and RUAAA for myriad reasons, including the hope that the acts 
effectively regulate agents due in large part to the acts’ potential for criminal, 
civil, and administrative penalties.125  Most states have adopted the UAAA or 
RUAAA.126  As the following examples illustrate, the alleged actions of the 
defendants in the college’ men’s basketball cases, if true, trigger the application 
of several UAAA and RUAAA provisions and thus imposed several obligations 
and restrictions on these individuals.   
1. The alleged actions of defendants Dawkins, Sood, Code, Gatto, and the four 
assistant coaches, if true, meet UAAA and RUAAA definitions of “athlete-
agent” and thus trigger athlete-agent status 
Whether an individual triggers athlete-agent status under the UAAA and/or 
RUAAA depends not on how the individual refers to herself or himself but 
rather on the individual’s actions.  The UAAA defines an athlete-agent as an 
individual who solicits or recruits a student-athlete to enter into an agency 
 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Associated Press, Violation of Sports Agent Laws Tough for States to Prosecute, USA TODAY, Nov. 
1, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2017/11/01/violatoin-of-sports-agent-laws-tough-for-
states-to-prosecute/107223304/ (examining reasons why states fail to prosecute violators). 
125.  See NCAA Need For and Benefits of the UAAA, supra note 116; see also Beard, supra note 121. 
126.  See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 2; see also RUAAA Map, supra note 114. 
LENS – ARTICLE 30.1 1/10/2020  11:59 AM 
2019]   ATHLETE AGENT LAWS AND COLLEGE BASKETBALL  67 
 
 
contract.127  Thus, the UAAA definition of athlete-agent could include licensed 
financial advisors, even those who do not refer to or consider themselves athlete-
agents, if they recruit a student-athlete to enter into an agency contract.128   
Because financial advisors often failed to register as athlete-agents and 
comply with the UAAA, the ULC revised the definition of “athlete agent” in the 
RUAAA such that it includes an individual who:  
(1) directly or indirectly recruits or solicits a student-athlete 
enter into an agency contract; (2) for compensation or in 
anticipation of compensation related to a student-athlete’s 
participation in athletics, serves the athlete in an advisory 
capacity on a matter related to finances, business pursuits, or 
career management decisions; or (3) in anticipation of 
representing a student-athlete for a purpose related to the 
athlete’s participation in athletics, gives consideration to the 
student-athlete or another person.129 
In revising its definition of athlete-agent in the RUAAA, the ULC intended to 
remove ambiguity of its applicability to financial advisors.130 
In both acts, the ULC defined recruit and solicit as attempting to influence 
a student-athlete or her or his parent or guardian on the choice of an athlete-
agent.131  The UAAA was silent on the issue of whether a college coach’s actions 
could trigger athlete-agent status; however, when considering the definition’s 
verbiage, a coach who recruited or solicited a student-athlete to enter into an 
agency contract was an athlete-agent.132  The UAAA does not contain an explicit 
exception for college coaches.  In a Comment to the RUAAA, the ULC 
explained that coaches and parents who receive compensation or expect to 
receive compensation in exchange for advising a student-athlete to select a 
particular agent meet the definition of athlete-agent and thus trigger athlete-
agent status.133 
The alleged actions of defendants Dawkins, Sood, Code, Gatto, and the four 
assistant coaches fall within the acts’ definitions of athlete-agent.  The federal 
complaints describe Dawkins as an athlete-advisor and allege that he bribed the 
 
127.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 8 (explaining that ULC outwardly expanded definition of athlete-agent 
to include financial advisors because, due to ambiguity of UAAA definition of athlete-agent, financial advisors 
often failed to register as athlete-agents). 
128.  See id. 
129.  Id. at 4.  The definition of “student athlete” applies to individuals who are not yet in college; thus, it 
includes high school students.  See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 9. 
130.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 8. 
131.  Id.   
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. at 8-9. 
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four assistant men’s basketball coaches to direct their student-athletes to retain 
Dawkins once the student-athletes entered the NBA.134  Federal authorities 
alleged that Dawkins is a runner—he befriended elite prospective student-
athletes and NBA prospects in hopes of both becoming their manager and 
influencing their choices regarding financial advisors, shoe companies, and 
agents.135  For example, Dawkins was allegedly among a group that attempted 
to funnel $150,000 to Little to get him to commit to the University of Miami, 
then sign with Adidas and Dawkins’s agency upon turning professional.136   
At one point in his career, Dawkins made $50,000 in annual salary 
recruiting NBA draft prospects on behalf of a financial advising firm.137  
Dawkins also worked for ASM Sports, the sports agency of the aforementioned 
Andy Miller that represented professional basketball players.138  Dawkins 
helped ASM Sports sign 2017 NBA draftees Justin Patton of Creighton 
University and Edmond Sumner of Xavier University.139  By soliciting student-
athletes on behalf of agents and advisors and paying assistant coaches 
Richardson and Bland to exert their influence over student-athletes to eventually 
sign with Dawkins, Dawkins’s actions meet the athlete-agent definition under 
both the UAAA and RUAAA.    
Sood founded Princeton Capital, an investment services firm that manages 
professional athletes’ finances.140  The UAAA and RUAAA definitions of 
athlete-agent both include financial advisors.141  Further, Sood allegedly made 
bribe payments to the four assistant coaches in exchange for their agreement to 
direct student-athletes they coached to retain Sood once the student-athletes 
entered the NBA.142  By making bribe payments to assistant coaches so they 
would exert influence over student-athletes to retain Sood once they entered the 
NBA, Sood’s actions triggered athlete-agent status under the RUAAA definition 
of athlete-agent.143   
 
134.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Dawkins).   
135.  Mark Schlabach and Jeff Goodman, How Christian Dawkins Went from Unknown to a Central 
Figure in a Scandal that Has Rocked College Basketball, ESPN (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.espn.com/mens-
college-basketball/story/_/id/20946451/how-christian-dawkins-went-unknown-central-figure-scandal-
rocked-college-basketball  (describing Dawkins’s background and alleged roles in corruption in men’s college 
basketball). 
136.  Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing individuals facing federal charges). 
137.  Schlabach & Goodman, supra note 135. 
138.  Id. (explaining that Dawkins may have actually worked for the financial advising firm and sports 
agency simultaneously, the subject of a lawsuit). 
139.  Id. (noting that both players fired ASM after federal authorities arrested Dawkins). 
140.  Rapaport, supra note 15. 
141.  See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 8-9. 
142.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations involving Sood). 
143.  See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 4. 
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Even though they were affiliated with Adidas and were not contract or 
financial advisors, the alleged actions of Gatto and Code likewise elicit athlete-
agent status under both the UAAA and RUAAA. Federal authorities allege that 
Gatto and Code were among a group that paid prospective student-athletes to 
attend certain universities and then sign with Adidas and a particular contract 
advisor or financial manager upon turning professional.144 For example, along 
with Sood, Gatto and Code allegedly paid $100,000 to prospective student-
athlete Brian Bowen so he would verbally commit to attending the University 
of Louisville, have Sood manage his money, and sign with Adidas upon entering 
the NBA.145 By soliciting or recruiting someone to enter into an agent agreement 
and providing him compensation in anticipation of representing him for a 
purpose related to the athlete’s participation in athletics (e.g., as an Adidas 
client), Gatto and Code’s actions meet both the UAAA and RUAAA definitions 
of athlete-agent, rendering them subject to the acts and state laws based on them. 
By attempting to influence a student-athlete’s choice of financial advisor 
and/or agent and receiving compensation for it, the actions of the four assistant 
coaches trigger athlete-agent status under both the UAAA and RUAAA and thus 
they were subject to state laws based on them.  More specifically, Person 
allegedly accepted bribe payments in exchange for agreeing to direct certain 
student-athletes to retain the services of a financial advisor, arranged meetings 
between student-athletes and the advisor, and paid families of two student-
athletes whom Person sought to steer to a manager 146  Richardson, Bland, and 
Evans allegedly accepted bribe payments in return for their commitments to 
steer student-athletes they coached at their respective universities to retain 
Dawkins’s and/or Sood’s services upon entering the NBA.147  Both Richardson 
and Bland also facilitated at least one meeting apiece between Dawkins, Sood 
and a student-athlete or his representative so the student-athlete would commit 




144.   Rapaport, supra note 15 (describing individuals facing federal charges). 
145.  Id. (identifying Nassir Little as another prospective student-athlete with whom Gatto and Code 
attempted to become involved). 
146.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).   
147.  Id. (describing allegations against Richardson, Bland, and Evans). 
148.  Id. (describing allegations against Richardson and Bland). 
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2. The UAAA and RUAAA and states that adopted them require an individual 
to register with and hold valid certification from the state before lawfully 
acting as an athlete-agent within the state.149  
As shown in the previous section, the actions of defendants Dawkins, Sood, 
Code, Gatto, and the four assistant coaches conferred athlete-agent status on 
those individuals under both the UAAA and RUAAA.  Thus, in UAAA and 
RUAAA states, athlete-agent laws required them to register in, and hold valid 
certification from, the states in which they acted as athlete-agents for those 
actions to have been lawful.150   
It is highly unlikely that Dawkins, Sood, Code, Gatto, and the four assistant 
coaches thought to register as athlete-agents in the states in which they acted as 
such, let alone took steps to register as athlete-agents.  For example, The State 
of Alabama has enacted the RUAAA.151  Alabama law requires an individual to 
register with the state prior to acting as an athlete-agent within the state.152  
Person allegedly: (1) accepted bribe payments from a financial advisor in 
exchange for agreeing to direct certain Auburn student-athletes to retain the 
advisor’s services; (2) arranged meetings between student-athletes and the 
advisor; and (3) gave bribe money to the families of two student-athletes to steer 
them to the advisor.153  By those actions, Person garnered athlete-agent status 
under Alabama law.154  However, Person is not listed in the Alabama Secretary 
of State’s online database listing registered athlete-agents.155  Under Alabama 
law, an athlete-agent may not initiate contact to recruit a student-athlete to enter 
an agency contract within Alabama unless the athlete-agent first registers.156  By 
recruiting student-athletes to enter an agency contract as an unregistered athlete-
agent, Person committed a Class A misdemeanor.157  Further, Person could be 
subject to a civil penalty up to $50,000 for violating Alabama athlete-agent 
laws.158 
 
149.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 10-11. 
150.  See id. 
151.  RUAAA Map, supra note 114. 
152. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-4 (2016), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/default/ 
files/2016-415.PDF.  
153.  See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).   
154. See Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-2(2) (2016), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/ 
default/files/2016-415.PDF. 
155.  Athlete Agent Listing, Alabama Secretary of State, http://arc-sos.state.al.us/cgi/athname.mbr/output 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019). 
156. Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-14(b)(1) (2016), https://www.sos.alabama.gov/sites/ 
default/files/2016-415.PDF.   
157.  See id. at §8-26B-15(c). 
158.  See id. at §8-26B-17. 
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3. The UAAA and RUAAA prohibit athlete-agents from giving materially false 
or misleading information or making a materially false promise or 
representation.159 
Both the UAAA and RUAAA prohibit athlete-agents from giving materially 
false or misleading information or making a materially false promise or 
representation during recruitment of a student-athlete.160  Person falsely told the 
mother of an Auburn student-athlete he coached that the financial advisor to 
whom Person sought to steer the student-athlete was Person’s own advisor and 
also advised Charles Barkley.161  In doing so, Person broke Alabama’s version 
of the RUAAA prohibition on giving materially false or misleading information 
or making a false representation during recruitment of a student-athlete.162  
Under Alabama law, Person’s misrepresentations constitute a Class B felony.163 
Evans also falsely touted the services of Sood and the advisor to Oklahoma 
State student-athletes and their families, dishonestly telling one student-athlete, 
for example, that the manager was Evans’s “guy.”164  The State of Oklahoma 
adopted a version of the UAAA.165  By falsely telling or misleading a student-
athlete that Evans used Sood’s services, Evans violated Oklahoma law.166  Thus, 
under Oklahoma law, Evans committed a misdemeanor that could subject him 
to a fine between $10,000 and $250,000 and/or imprisonment up to one year.167 
4. The UAAA and RUAAA contain prohibitions on athlete-agents offering 
items of value to certain individuals during recruitment of student-athletes.168 
During an athlete-agent’s recruitment of an athlete, the UAAA and RUAAA 
prohibit an athlete-agent from furnishing anything of value to an athlete prior to 
the athlete entering the agency contract.169  The RUAAA also prohibits an 
 
159.   RUAAA, supra note 110, at 2, 41. 
160.  Id; see The Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (2015) – A Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM‘N, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=aceaa
94e-e641-45a6-f481-b43973739b82&forceDialog=0 (describing agents who mislead student-athletes as 
unethical). 
161.  See Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).   
162.  Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-14(a)(1) (2016). 
163.  Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-15(a) (2016). 
164.   Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Evans).   
165. See Kelli Masters, So You Want to Be a Sports Agent?, OKLA. BAR J. (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.okbar.org/barjournal/oct2018/obj8926masters/ (describing requirements of athlete-agents). 
166.  70 OKLA. STAT. §70-821.94.A.1 (2014).   
167.  70 OKLA. STAT. §70-821.95 (2018). 
168.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 2. 
169.  Id. 
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athlete-agent from: (1) encouraging any other individual to take or assist another 
individual in taking any prohibited actions on behalf of the agent and (2) making 
any payment or providing anything of value to an individual who is in a position 
to influence a student-athlete to enter into an agency contract unless that 
individual is registered as an athlete-agent.170 
The allegations surrounding Person provide an example of the application 
of the legislation.  An advisor, who by his actions is an athlete-agent under 
Alabama law, paid bribe money to Person in exchange for Person agreeing to 
direct student-athletes to retain the advisor’s services.171  Person, whose actions 
also trigger athlete-agent status under Alabama law, allegedly paid $18,500 to 
the families of two student-athletes whom Person sought to steer to the 
advisor.172  In making the payments, the advisor and Person both violated 
Alabama’s version of the RUAAA prohibition on athlete-agents furnishing 
anything of value to certain individuals.173  By engaging in this prohibited 
conduct, both Person and the advisor committed Class B felonies under 
Alabama law.174 
5. The RUAAA requires athlete-agents to notify a university’s athletic director 
prior to lawfully engaging in certain contact with student-athletes.175 
The RUAAA requires an athlete-agent to notify the university’s athletic 
director prior to communicating or attempting to communicate with: (1) a 
student-athlete to influence him to enter into an agency contract or (2) another 
individual to have that individual influence the student-athlete.176  In adding 
these requirements, the ULC intended that universities receive prior notice of 
communication between an athlete-agent and an enrolled student-athlete.177 
Person allegedly accepted $91,500 in bribe payments from an advisor in 
exchange for agreeing to direct certain student-athletes to retain the services of 
the advisor.178  Person arranged multiple meetings between student-athletes and 
the advisor during which Person (falsely) touted the advisor’s qualifications.179  
It is highly unlikely that the advisor notified Auburn’s athletic director of his 
 
170.  Id. at 2-3, 41. 
171.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).   
172.  Id. 
173.  Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-14(a)(3) (2016). 
174.  Id. at §8-26B-15(a) (2016). 
175.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 38-39. 
176.  See id. 
177.  See id. at 39. 
178.  Department of Justice, supra note 16 (describing allegations against Person).   
179.  Id. 
LENS – ARTICLE 30.1 1/10/2020  11:59 AM 
2019]   ATHLETE AGENT LAWS AND COLLEGE BASKETBALL  73 
 
 
communication with Person (someone with influence over a student-athlete) or 
the meetings with student-athletes.  Further, it is highly unlikely that Person 
notified Auburn’s athletic director of the meetings Person arranged between the 
student-athletes and the advisor (whose actions triggered athlete-agent status).  
In fact, Auburn president Steven Leath said shortly after Person’s arrest that 
there was no indication that anyone at Auburn knew anything about Person’s 
involvement in the scandal.180  Thus, both the advisor and Person violated 
Alabama law notification requirements that mirror RUAAA provisions.181 
6. Both the UAAA and RUAAA provide for civil penalties and remedies.182 
Both the UAAA and RUAAA permit the state official or entity responsible 
for enforcement of the act to assess a civil fine on athlete-agents for violating 
the legislation.183  Further, the UAAA provides for a civil cause of action for a 
university against a student-athlete for damages caused by a violation of the 
act.184  Under the RUAAA, a university or student-athlete may bring an action 
against an athlete-agent if the university or student-athlete is adversely affected 
by an athlete-agent’s violation of the act that results in suspension of the student-
athlete.185   
The situation at Auburn again provides an example of the legislation’s 
potential application.  Auburn suspended men’s basketball student-athletes 
Austin Wiley and Danjel Purifoy following news of the federal investigation.186  
Auburn admitted that Person gave $11,000 to Purifoy’s mother and $7,500 to 
Wiley’s mother and thus Auburn would withhold the pair from competitions “to 
avoid any potential issues.”187  Because Person’s action (providing money to the 
student-athletes’ mothers) resulted in the suspensions of the student-athletes, 
Alabama’s law based on the RUAAA affords Auburn and the student-athletes a 
 
180.  See Tom Green, Auburn President on Chuck Person Arrest: “This Was an Isolated Individual,” 
AL.COM (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.al.com/auburnbasketball/2017/09/auburn_president_on_chuck_ 
pers.html (providing Leath’s reaction to Person’s arrest). 
181.  Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-11(f) (2016). 
182.  See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 43-44. 
183.  See id. 
184.  See id. 
185.  See id. 
186.  See Rapaport, supra note 15.   
187.  See Erik Hall, Danjel Purifoy: A Timeline of His Auburn Basketball Career, FBI Investigation 
Fallout, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 15, 2018, https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/ 
sports/2018/12/14/danjel-purifoy-timeline-auburn-college-basketball-fbi-fallout-bruce-pearl/2318376002 
(providing timeline of Purifoy’s Auburn career).   
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civil cause of action against Person.188  Under Alabama law, a prevailing 
plaintiff may recover actual damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees.189  
Further, if enforced, Person would be subject to an Alabama Secretary of State 
fine of up to $50,000 for violating the act.190 
C. State Athlete-Agent Laws and Lack of Resources 
The UAAA and RUAAA, and state versions of them, were applicable to the 
actions of the defendants in the men’s college basketball case yet there are no 
public reports of state authorities using athlete-agent laws to discipline the 
defendants.  States rarely enforce their respective versions of the UAAA or 
RUAAA.191  In fact, there are few cases of prosecution of agents under the 
acts.192  One prominent agent describes enforcement of state agent laws as 
“lacking.”193  In fact, a recent Associated Press review found that more than half 
of the then 42 states with athlete-agent laws had yet to revoke or suspend a single 
license or invoke penalties of any sort.194   
According to the individual state entities responsible for enforcing their 
athlete-agent laws, a main reason for the lack of enforcement is that athlete-
agent laws often come with no funding.195  This lack of resources negatively 
affects the success of state athlete-agent laws in deterring elicit acts, including 
 
188.  Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-16(a)(1) (2016).  Auburn self-reported violations of 
NCAA amateurism provisions involving recruiting issues, extra benefits, and agent-related activity.  See 
Matthew Stevens, NCAA Rules Danjel Purifoy to Serve Suspension But Will be Eligible for 2018-19 Season, 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Mar. 20, 2018, https://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story/sports/college/ 
aburn/2018/03/20/ncaa-rules-danjel-purifoy-serve-suspension-but-eligible-2018-19-season/444143002/ 
(describing NCAA rulings on Purifoy and Wiley).   
189.  Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-16(b) (2016). 
190.  Alabama Revised Athlete Agents Act §8-26B-17 (2016). 
191.  See Commission on College Basketball, Report and Recommendations to Address the Issues Facing 
Collegiate Basketball, COMM’N ON COLLEGE BASKETBALL, 34 n.25 (Apr. 2018), available at 
www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018CCBReportFinal_web_20180501.pdf (issuing a report and 
recommendations to NCAA Board of Governors, Division I Board of Directors, and NCAA President Mark 
Emmert).  See also Associated Press, AP Study: Laws for Sports Agents Rarely Enforced, DENVER POST, May 
5, 2016, https://www.denverpost.com/2010/08/17/ap-study-laws-for-sports-agents-rarely-enforced/ (detailing 
AP survey). 
192.  See James Masteralexis et al., Enough is Enough: The Case for Federal Regulation of Sport Agents, 
20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69, 90 (2013) (suggesting adoption of federal legislation applicable to 
athlete-agents). 
193.  See Masters, supra note 165. 
194.  Associated Press, supra note 191 (describing state athlete-agent laws as a “low priority” for many 
states). 
195.  See id. (noting that the State of North Carolina had to use state workers who usually investigated 
securities fraud to look into possible violation of its athlete-agent laws).  See also Associated Press, supra note 
124 (quoting Sankey, “There’s clearly a role for states.”). 
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athlete-agents routinely offering inducements to athletes to sign them.196  
Practically, state-level investigators and prosecutors face a dilemma of where 
these cases fit when violent crimes and high-level felonies are priorities and 
space-eaters on court schedules.197   
Unless things change, the unfortunate reality of lack of sufficient funding to 
give state athlete-agent laws teeth results in potentially effective and deterrent 
state legislation with the possibility of criminal prosecution, civil fines and civil 
causes of action left on the sideline. The availability of these private causes of 
action are especially important for universities, as they face the possibility of 
losing millions of dollars if subject to NCAA sanctions resulting from a student-
athlete’s violation of NCAA rules.198  If the university is state-subsidized, the 
state may also suffer financial harm due to athlete-agent actions, thus providing 
even more incentive for states to enforce their athlete-agent laws.199 
IV. SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO THE UAAA, RUAAA, AND STATE ATHLETE-
AGENT LAWS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE NCAA’S RECENT RULES CHANGES 
State officials responsible for enforcement of athlete-agent laws failed to 
apply those laws to the actions of the defendants in the federal probe of 
corruption in men’s college basketball.  Likewise, the NCAA failed to account 
for the UAAA, RUAAA, and state athlete-agent laws when it made broad, 
sweeping changes to rules applicable to men’s basketball following news of the 
federal investigation.   
A. The NCAA’s Response to the Federal Investigation 
1. The Commission on College Basketball and its Report 
Federal authorities did not notify the NCAA about the investigation until 
the day they announced charges against the ten defendants.200  In fact, the 
 
196.  See Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 
WAKE FOREST U. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, 26 (2006)(describing effects of various athlete-agent 
regulations).  See also Masteralexis, supra note 192, at 70. 
197.  See Associated Press, supra note 124 (noting that violations of athlete-agent laws, while felonies, 
are typically low-level felonies). 
198.  See Timothy G. Nelson, Flag on the Play: The Ineffectiveness of Athlete-Agent Laws and 
Regulations—and How North Carolina Can Take Advantage of a Scandal to be a Model for Reform, 90 N.C. 
L. REV. 800, 816 (2012) (citing the University of Southern California as an example).   
199.  See Diane Sudia and Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millennium: State Statutes 
and the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 273 (2001) (describing myriad 
authorities regulating athlete-agents). 
200.  See Norlander, supra note 14. 
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announcement caught NCAA President Mark Emmert off guard.201  In an 
ambitious response to news of the federal investigation, the NCAA Board of 
Governors, Division I Board of Directors, and NCAA President established the 
Commission on College Basketball in October 2017.202  Composed of 
individuals such as former U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice (chair 
of the Commission), Ohio State University athletics director Gene Smith, NBA 
legends David Robinson and Grant Hill, and former head coaches Mike 
Montgomery and John Thompson, III, the Commission’s charges included the 
gathering of information to make transformative recommendations to protect 
the integrity of men’s college basketball.203 
In its 2018 Report and Recommendations to Address the Issues Facing 
Collegiate Basketball, the Commission acknowledged that men’s college 
basketball is a multi-billion dollar enterprise, which can increase the incentive 
for elite student-athletes, coaches, universities, apparel companies, agents, and 
advisors to break rules.204  More specifically, the Commission recognized that 
third parties--including agents, apparel companies, and advisors--seeking to 
enter into relationships with potential professionals when they are in high school 
and college violate NCAA rules by paying players and those with influence over 
players, including coaches, in hope of future payoff.205  To its credit, the 
Commission recognized that these payments violate the UAAA and RUAAA.206  
Further, college coaches and third parties such as apparel companies, agents, 
and advisors may pay family members of prospective student-athletes who have 
influence over the prospect.207   
In its Report, the Commission made a number of recommendations 
including implementation of an NCAA certification process and requirement of 
athlete-agents as well as providing for opportunities for certified athlete-agents 
to engage with student-athletes.208  Recognizing that increased contact between 
athlete-agents and student-athletes can lead to impermissible payments and 
 
201.  See Tracy, supra note 15 (noting that Emmert pledged the NCAA’s support of the federal 
investigation from the start). 
202.  See Commission on College Basketball, Commission on College Basketball Charter, NCAA, § 1 
(Apr. 2018), available at www.ncaa.org/governance/commission-college-basketball-charter (including 
information on the group including its charges, makeup, and responsibilities). 
203.  See id. at §§ 2-3; see also Myron Medcalf, New NCAA Rules are More Cosmetic Than They Are 
Consequential, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2018), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_id/24320626/ncaa-
rule-changes-not-address-issues-fbi-investigation (questioning effectiveness of NCAA’s changes to men’s 
basketball rules). 
204.  Commission on College Basketball, supra note 191 at 18. 
205.  See id. at 29-30. 
206.  See id. at 44. 
207.  See id. at 25. 
208.  See id.  
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other violations, the Commission recommended serious consequences for 
NCAA-certified agents who violate NCAA rules.209  The Commission 
concluded that apparel companies have served as a harmful influence on men’s 
college basketball, and, as public companies, should provide increased 
transparency about spending on non-scholastic basketball.210 
2. NCAA rules changes responsive to both the federal investigation and 
Commission recommendations 
The NCAA created quite a stir with its first legislative action after the 
federal case became public.211  In August 2018, the NCAA made “profound and 
meaningful changes to college basketball” intended to support the success of 
student-athletes on and off the court.212  To do so, the NCAA pushed through 
rules changes in about three and a half months that would normally take years 
through the NCAA’s standard governance process.213  One intent of the changes 
is to minimize the leverage of outside influences on prospective and current 
student-athletes.214   
For example, the NCAA implemented a rule requiring coaches and athletics 
staff members to report to university presidents or chancellors athletics-related 
income from any outside source greater than $600.215  In its release, the NCAA 
 
209.  See id. at 44.  This is all the more reason for increasing education and enforcement of state athlete-
agent laws. 
210.  See Commission on College Basketball, supra note 191 at 11-14. 
211.  See Jon Nyatawa, The NCAA Enacted Various Basketball Rule Changes. How Will They Affect Local 
Teams?,  OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.omaha.com/sports/the-ncaa-enacted-various-
basketball-rule-changes-how-will-they/article_2c2fe63d-1606-5518-acd9-bc0ca182f1e6.html (detailing 
NCAA legislative changes and effects on Omaha-area men’s college basketball programs). 
212.  See NCAA, Statement From NCAA Leaders on College Basketball Reforms, NCAA (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2018-08-08/statement-ncaa-leaders-college-basketball-
reforms (describing purposes behind changing rules applicable to NCAA men’s basketball) [hereinafter 
NCAA Statement].  Some feel the rules changes stop short of accomplishing transformative and meaningful 
change.  See also Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, “Committed Change” for Men’s Basketball, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 
9, 2018), https://www.insidehighred.com/news/2018/08/09/new-ncaa-rules-allow-mens-basketball-players-
have-agents-return-college-if-undrafted (characterizing NCAA’s reforms as “small” yet cast as “glorious”). 
213.  See Fox News, NCAA Adopts College Basketball Policy Changes Based on Condoleezza Rice 
Panel’s Recommendations, FOX NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/sports/ncaa-adopts-college-
basketball-policy-changes-based-on-condoleezza-rice-panels-recommendations (describing NCAA rules 
changes). 
214. See NCAA, Minimizing Harmful Outside Influences, NCAA (Aug. 8, 2018), www.ncaa.org/about/ 
minimizing-harmful-outiside-influences (describing rule changes intended to reduce the leverage of harmful 
outside influences on current and prospective men’s basketball student-athletes). 
215.  Id. 
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specifically listed endorsement or consultation contracts with apparel 
companies as an example of an outside source.216 
Further, in a stark departure from its longtime ban on agent involvement, 
the NCAA now permits agent representation for men’s basketball student-
athletes with remaining collegiate eligibility who request an evaluation from the 
NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee.217  A recent example of a student-
athlete taking advantage of this rule change is University of Minnesota junior 
guard Amir Coffey.  Following the 2018-19 season, Coffey requested an 
Advisory Committee evaluation, declared for the draft, and hired an agent.218  
Due to recent NCAA rules changes, Coffey can go through the draft process 
with the assistance of an agent yet retain collegiate eligibility if he decides to 
return to school.219 
Additionally, the NCAA also now permits high school seniors identified as 
elite prospects to hire agents.220  The NCAA deemed the rule change permitting 
agents for certain current men’s basketball student-athletes effective 
immediately and the rule change applicable to certain prospective men’s 
basketball student-athletes effective if or when the NBA and NBPA permit high 
school students to enter the NBA draft.221 
Not only may certain men’s basketball student-athletes permissibly hire 
agents, the NCAA also changed its rules such that it is permissible for agents to 
pay certain expenses for these student-athletes.222  Agents may now pay for 
meals and transportation for student-athletes and their families if the expenses 
relate to the agent selection process.223  Further, once a high school or college 
student-athlete and agent sign a representation agreement, agents may 
 
216.  Id. 
217.  Going Pro, supra note 10.  See Mark Tracy, N.C.A.A. Alters Rules for Agents and Draft in Wake of 
Basketball Corruption Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/sports/ 
ncaa-basketball-agents.html.  The NBA Undergraduate Advisory Committee is composed of NBA team 
executives who, upon request of an undergraduate student-athlete, provide a confidential projection of a 
potential draftee’s likely draft position.  See Memorandum from NCAA to NCAA Division I Directors of 
Athletics, Senior Compliance Administrators and Men’s Basketball Head Coaches (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/enforcement/2019ENF_NBAMemo.pdf  (describing “testing the waters” 
process for undergraduate men’s basketball student-athletes).   
218.  See Marcus Fuller, Amir Coffey Declares for NBA Draft and Will Hire Agent, but Could Return to 
Gophers, STAR TRIBUNE, Apr. 4, 2019, www.startribune.com/amir-coffey-declares-for-nba-draft-and-will-
hire-agent-but-could-return-to-gophers/508078242/ (describing Coffey’s decision and application of new 
NCAA legislation). 
219.  Id. 
220.  Going Pro, supra note 10.   
221.  Id. 
222.  Id. 
223.  Id.  Any student-athlete for whom an agent pays these expenses may not miss class and the money 
must be spent where the student-athlete lives or attends school.  
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permissibly pay for meals, transportation, and lodging expenses for the athlete 
and his family members when those expenses relate to meetings with the agent 
or a professional team.224   
For better or worse, the NCAA pushed these rules changes through without 
sorting through particulars.225  Emmert and top NCAA officials acknowledged 
at the time that they had yet to work out several details.226  In a statement 
describing the purposes of the rules changes, Emmert, NCAA Board of 
Governors chair and Georgia Tech president G.P. “Bud” Peterson, and Division 
I Board of Directors chair and University of Minnesota, Twin Cities president 
Eric Kaler noted that the NCAA would continue to pursue collaboration with 
outside organizations, including the NBA and apparel companies.227  Dan 
Gavitt, the NCAA’s senior vice president of basketball, later admitted there was 
a “breakdown in communications” between the NCAA and the NBA, NBPA, 
and USA Basketball.228  Notably absent from the list of entities with which the 
NCAA stated it would continue to pursue collaboration is the ULC, the entity 
responsible for drafting the UAAA and RUAAA.229  This absence is telling, as 
it shows that the NCAA continues to overlook the importance of alignment with 
the drafters of the athlete-agent legislation the NCAA, despite pledging full 
support on its very own website, had just trampled.   
To its credit, the NCAA recognized that the UAAA, RUAAA, and relevant 
state laws prohibit agents from providing expenses to prospective clients prior 
to signing them.230  “Currently, many if not most of all the UAAA laws do not 
allow for several of the things that we would like this agent relationship to allow 
for,” said Gavitt.231  “Currently, I believe, agents cannot provide meals and 
 
224.  Id. 
225.  See Matt Norlander, College Basketball Rule Changes: What Will Happen With the NCAA’s New 
Rules for Recruiting and the NBA Draft, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
basketball/news/college-basketball-rule-changes-what-will-happen-with-the-ncaas-new-rules-for-recruiting-
and-the-nba-draft/ (summarizing interview with Dan Gavitt). 
226.  See Nyatawa, supra note 211 (querying whether NCAA moved too quickly). 
227.  NCAA Statement, supra note 212.  Both the NBA and USA Basketball had consulted with the 
NCAA on proposed changes but neither organization believed the group reached a consensus prior to the 
NCAA announcement of its rule changes. Jim Young, NCAA Changes Policies on Draft, Agents, Recruiting; 
NBA Reportedly ‘Blindsided’, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-basketball-ncaa-
ncaa-agents-draft-idUSKBN1KT2D4 (describing interplay between NCAA and various entities prior to 
NCAA rules changes applicable to men’s college basketball). 
228.  Andy Katz, What You Need to Know About Flexibility for Going Pro and Getting a Degree, NCAA 
(Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2018-08-09/college-basketball-rule-
changes-what-you-need-know-about (summarizing NCAA rules changes). 
229.  See NCAA Statement, supra note 212; see also Young, supra note 227.  The NCAA and ULC were 
to participate on a conference call in August 2018.  See also Nyatawa, supra note 211. 
230.  See Going Pro, supra note 10.   
231.  Norlander, supra note 225 (noting that NCAA had been in touch with ULC). 
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transportation and things like that to a prospect and their family—not based on 
our rules, but UAAA.”232  Thus, the NCAA made its new rule permitting agents 
to provide pre-agreement expenses effective after the UAAA, RUAAA, and 
state laws change and align with the revised NCAA rules.233   
B. Necessary Revisions to the UAAA, RUAAA, and State Athlete-Agent Laws 
The NCAA’s website states that it supports the UAAA “and its adoption in 
every state….The UAAA is an important tool in regulating the activities of 
athlete agents and protecting NCAA student-athletes and member 
institutions.”234  The NCAA goes so far as to provide a sample advocacy letter 
to a senator or representative urging adoption of the UAAA, a sample supportive 
testimony in favor of the UAAA, and a model press release for legislative staffs 
that sponsor the UAAA.235  The NCAA has a unique way of showing this 
support, however, having revised its rules such that some now conflict with 
UAAA and RUAAA provisions.   
Now the ULC and individual states must revise the UAAA, RUAAA, and 
laws if they desire consistency with NCAA legislation.236  Politicians in 
Kentucky, for example, considered revising state athlete-agent laws prior to the 
scandal in men’s college basketball.237  Now in the midst of the aftermath of the 
initial trial, including an NCAA investigation of the University of Louisville, 
Kentucky lawmakers seek to strengthen state laws governing athlete-agents.238  
Missouri lawmakers responded to the federal probe similarly, introducing a bill 
that would toughen the state’s athlete-agent laws.239 
 
232.  Id. 
233.  Going Pro, supra note 10.  On the other hand, the new rule permitting expenses for student-athletes 
who sign with an agent is effective immediately.  
234.  NCAA, Agents and Amateurism, NCAA, www.ncaa.org/enforcement/agents-and-amateurism (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2019) (describing athlete-agent authorities and NCAA’s position on them).   
235.  See id. 
236.  One respected academic argues that, instead of individual states conforming their laws to changes to 
NCAA legislation, the NCAA should conform its legislation to match state laws, as the purpose of state law 
is to declare and enforce values from which individual organizations may not vary.  E-mail feedback from 
Alfred C. Yen, Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School, to Sports 
Lawyers Association Conference article presentation (May 15, 2019).   
237.  See Linda Blackford, Kentucky Lawmakers Seek to Tighten Rules on Sports Agents, LEXINGTON 
HERALD LEADER, March 7, 2018, https://www.kentucky.com/news/local/education/article203881199.html 
(describing legislative reform efforts in Kentucky). 
238.  Id. 
239.  See Aaron Reiss, Missouri Legislators Want Sports Agents to Follow These Rules Because of FBI 
Probe, KAN. CITY STAR, April 27, 2018, https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article209939374.html (describing legislative efforts in Missouri). 
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1. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to more clearly state that the actions of 
coaches and financial advisors can meet the definition of athlete-agent and 
trigger athlete-agent status 
As seen in Section III.B.1., supra, the actions of the defendants in the men’s 
college basketball trial triggered the athlete-agent designation when applying 
each act’s definition of athlete-agent.  However, reaching this conclusion 
requires thoughtful application and research that the ULC could avoid with 
slight revisions to the UAAA and RUAAA.240 The UAAA is silent on the 
issue.241 The RUAAA references the possibility of coaches triggering athlete-
agent status when, for example, advising a student-athlete to select a particular 
agent when the coach receives compensation from the agent.242  However, this 
reference is in the definition of “Recruit or solicit” (instead of within the 
definition of “Athlete agent”) and in a comment that may not appear within the 
legislation itself when adopted and published by states.  Thus, ULC drafters 
should consider explicitly referencing coaches and financial advisors possibly 
triggering athlete-agent status in the text of any provision that includes the 
definition of an athlete-agent.  This would not only increase clarity but help put 
those individuals on notice. 
2. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to account for the fact that select men’s 
basketball student-athletes may now hire agents and retain collegiate eligibility 
to compete  
When the NCAA, in a landmark and unilateral decision, permitted select 
men’s basketball student-athletes to hire agents, yet retain collegiate eligibility 
to compete, the organization overturned its own longstanding rule.243  When 
drafting the UAAA and RUAAA, the ULC presumably took the NCAA’s 
prohibition on student-athletes hiring agents for granted, and incorporated the 
ban into the acts’ language.  For example, both acts require agents to notify 
student-athletes who sign an agency contract that signing it may render them 
ineligible.244  Under recently changed NCAA legislation, however, when an 
eligible men’s basketball student-athlete hires an agent and opts to not enter the 
 
240.  See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 8-9. 
241.  Id. at 8.   
242.  Id. at 9. 
243. See Michael McCann, What’s Really to Come From the NCAA’s Student-Athlete Agent 
Announcement?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 8, 2018, https://www.si.com/college-basketball/2018/08/08/ 
ncaa-agents-student-athlete-one-and-done-nba-draft (explaining that NCAA long feared that attorneys, 
accountants, and other informed adults acting as agents would exploit, rather than inform and educate, college 
athletes).  
244.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 35-37. 
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NBA draft and returns to his university, he retains eligibility to compete if he 
terminates his agreement with the agent.245  Thus, ULC drafters should consider 
amending the acts to require agents signing a men’s basketball student-athlete 
to notify him how he may retain eligibility to compete collegiately or at least 
advise him to seek counsel from his university regarding maintaining eligibility.  
Further, ULC drafters should consider requiring agents to file evidence of 
termination of the agreement with both the appropriate state entity and athletics 
department.   
3. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to permit agents to provide certain men’s 
basketball student-athletes and their family members with expenses associated 
with the agent selection process 
Due to the NCAA’s recent changes to its longstanding and rigid rules, 
agents may pay for meals and transportation for select men’s basketball student-
athletes and their family members if the expenses relate to the agent selection 
process.246  However, both the UAAA and RUAAA prohibit agents from 
furnishing anything of value to an athlete or any other individual before the 
athlete enters into a contract.247  The ULC, if it seeks to align its acts with recent 
NCAA rules changes, must insert an exception to the prohibition on furnishing 
anything of value to permit agents to pay for these now NCAA-permissible 
expenses related to the agent selection process.   
Both acts already require athlete-agents to retain and make available to the 
state records of “the direct costs incurred by the agent in the recruitment or 
solicitation of each student athlete to enter into an agency contract.”248  If agents 
are aware of and follow this requirement (and states enforce it), they may be less 
likely to make payments to student-athletes or their family members (i.e., 
payments beyond the permissible meals and transportation expenses) that could 
render a student-athlete ineligible to compete under NCAA rules.249  Further, 
 
245.  See NCAA, supra note 8. 
246.  Going Pro, supra note 10.  See McCann, supra note 243 (explaining that rule change helps create a 
normal experience for elite college athletes who sometimes see classroom peers wined and dined by corporate 
recruiters without accompanying worry of NCAA eligibility). 
247.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 7, 41. 
248.  Id. at 2, 40. 
249.  ULC drafters may also consider requiring individuals registering as athlete-agents within a state to 
disclose during the registration process whether they represent any university employees within the state.  
Further, both the UAAA and RUAAA require athlete-agents to disclose certain information (e.g., a description 
of services the agent will provide) to the athlete at signing.  See RUAAA, supra note 110, at 1, 35.  ULC 
drafters should also consider requiring athlete-agents to disclose on the warning provision of the representation 
agreement whether they represent any employees of the university the student-athletes attend.  It is a conflict 
 
LENS – ARTICLE 30.1 1/10/2020  11:59 AM 
2019]   ATHLETE AGENT LAWS AND COLLEGE BASKETBALL  83 
 
 
the ULC may wish to consider expanding the document retention and 
availability requirement to allow a university to request and obtain 
documentation of costs incurred by an agent in the recruitment of the 
university’s student-athlete(s). 
4. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to prohibit agents from offering or 
providing an item of value to an individual to increase the likelihood that an 
athlete attends a particular university 
The “Prohibited Conduct” section of both the UAAA and RUAAA contain 
prohibitions on athlete-agents from furnishing anything of value to an athlete 
prior to the athlete entering into a representation agreement.250  Further, the 
RUAAA prohibits athlete-agents from furnishing anything of value to an 
individual other than the athlete.251  However, these prohibitions apply to 
furnishing anything during the athlete-agent recruitment process only.252   
One could argue that the defendants in this case furnished items of value 
(i.e., money) to prospective student-athletes in order to influence their university 
selection process separate from the athlete-agent recruitment process.  However, 
federal authorities describe, and jurors confirmed, that the bribe payors paid 
prospective student-athletes in exchange for a commitment by the athletes to 
matriculate at a specific university and a promise to ultimately sign 
representation agreements with the bribe-paying advisors.253  Including in the 
acts a prohibition on athlete-agents furnishing an item of value to an athlete or 
another individual in order to facilitate matriculation at a specific university 
would clear up any confusion.  Additionally, including such a prohibition would 
further align the acts with NCAA regulations.  In 2012, the NCAA expanded its 
definition of agent to include an individual who “seeks to obtain any type of 
financial gain or benefit from securing a prospective student-athlete’s 
enrollment” at a university.254 
 
 
of interest for a coach’s agent to recruit the coach’s draft-eligible underclassman.  See Josh Lens, When a 
College Coach’s Agent Recruits the Coach’s Players:  Potential Legal and NCAA Ramifications, 26 JEFFREY 
S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 13-14 (2019).  This alerts the student-athlete, and potentially others, of the potential 
for a conflict of interest and would help mitigate the likelihood of someone the student-athlete trusts falsely 
telling a student-athlete that an individual represents him such as was the case with assistant coaches Person 
and Evans. 
250.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 41-42. 
251.  Id. 
252.  Id. 
253.  Department of Justice, supra note 16. 
254.  NCAA Manual 2018-19, supra note 7, at § 12.02.1. 
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5. Revising the UAAA and RUAAA to account for the NCAA’s new athlete-
agent registration  
A facet of the package of changes to rules applicable to men’s college 
basketball is a new NCAA agent certification process.255  Several of the acts’ 
provisions dealing with the athlete-agent registration process require the 
applicable state entity’s registration application to inquire of certification by any 
professional sports players association(s) (e.g., National Basketball Players 
Association).256  If the ULC wants to recognize the entirety of recent changes to 
NCAA rules, it should update the acts’ provisions regarding the agent 
registration process to include the NCAA within the list of possible entities with 
which the agent is certified.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Most states have passed a version of the UAAA or RUAAA to regulate 
athlete-agent behavior and protect universities.  However, despite recent 
widespread corruption in men’s college basketball, state entities and individuals 
charged with enforcing state athlete-agent laws failed to detect the 
transgressions and/or pursue penalties against wrongdoers whose actions should 
have triggered the application of the laws.  Hopefully the recent scandal in men’s 
college basketball brings attention to the need for enforcement of state athlete-
agent laws, which, if properly enforced, are equipped to serve not only as a 
powerful deterrent to illicit behavior by athlete-agents but also protection to 
student-athletes and universities. 
At the same time, the NCAA, in response to the scandal, revised its 
longstanding rules to permit select men’s basketball student-athletes to not only 
hire agents but allow them to provide benefits to these student-athletes and their 
family members.  While the NCAA maintains that it supports the UAAA, it 
disregarded it when revising its rules pertaining to athlete-agents.  As a result, 
NCAA rules on athlete-agents in men’s basketball no longer align with state 
athlete-agent laws, the UAAA, and the RUAAA.  If drafters of these laws and 
acts wish to maintain conformity with NCAA legislation, they must revise the 
laws and acts to take into account the recent changes to NCAA legislation.   
 
255.  Going Pro, supra note 10 (noting that NCAA has not determined deadline for agent certification, 
but the deadline will not be later than August 1, 2020). 
256.  RUAAA, supra note 110, at 15-18.   
